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Abstract
Neoclassical growth theory assumes that economic growth is an atomistic pro-
cess in which changes in distribution play no role. Unfortunately, when this as-
sumption is tested against real-world evidence, it is systematically violated. This
paper argues that a reality-based growth theory must reject neoclassical principles
in favour of a power-centered approach. Building on Nitzan and Bichler’s Capi-
tal as Power hypothesis, I argue that hierarchy formation is an integral part of the
growth process. I hypothesize that the role of capital accumulation (through profit)
is to facilitate hierarchy formation by legitimizing the authority of capitalists.
* Blair Fix is a PhD student in the Environmental Studies program at York University.
He is the author of the book Rethinking Economic Growth Theory from a Biophysical
Perspective. His research challenges neoclassical theories of growth and aims to con-
struct a new theory that combines biophysical analysis with radical political economy.
1 Introduction
Neoclassical growth theory is the dominant approach to understanding economic growth.
The canonical neoclassical model – the Solow-Swan model – treats growth as an atom-
istic process that takes place under conditions of perfect competition. Thus, it assumes
that concentrated power plays no role in the growth process. Moreover, neoclassical
growth theory assumes that changes in economic distribution have no effect on growth.
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to empirically demonstrate that these assump-
tions are false; and secondly, to begin formulating a growth theory that does explain
reality.
This paper provides evidence that a three-way link exists between distribution, cor-
porate employment concentration, and the growth of energy consumption. Building on
the Capital as Power framework proposed by Nitzan and Bichler (2009), I argue that hi-
erarchy plays a central role in growth, and that the role of capital accumulation (through
profit) is to facilitate hierarchy formation by legitimizing capitalist authority.
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1.1 Neoclassical Growth Theory
Neoclassical growth theory is a logical extension of the neoclassical theory of the firm.
The latter treats the firm as a ‘black box’ – all that is known are inputs (labor and capital)
and outputs (goods and services). Neoclassical microeconomics posits the existence of
a ‘production function’ – essentially a formula – that can explain how the quantities of
a firm’s inputs are related to the quantities of its outputs.
Neoclassical macroeconomics applies the same line of thinking to the entire econ-
omy: it is the economy that becomes a black box, described only by inputs and outputs.
It is posited that a unique aggregate production function exists that can quantitatively
explain how capital and labor inputs relate to total economic output. Although there
are many varieties of neoclassical growth theory, the Solow-Swan model (Solow 1956;
Swan 1956) has become the canonical approach (Acemoglu 2008). At its core is a
Cobb-Douglas production function (Eq. 1) in which capital (K), labor (L) and ‘techni-
cal progress’ (A) mix together to create material output (Y ).1
Y = ALβKα (1)
While there are numerous problems with production functions,2 for the present dis-
cussion, I am concerned with the following two implicit assumptions contained within
the Solow-Swan model: (1) distribution is unrelated to growth; and (2) large institutions
(i.e. concentrated power) are unimportant to growth
I begin with distribution. A central tenet of neoclassical distribution theory is that
one’s income is proportional to one’s marginal productivity. When applied to neoclas-
sical growth theory, marginal productivity theory predicts that the exponents α and β
(in Eq. 1) should be equal to capital and labor’s share of income, respectively. In neo-
classical growth theory, it has become standard practice to assume that these exponents
are constant.
This tradition has its roots in the work of Cobb and Douglas (1928), who showed
that fixed exponents could be used to model historical production. The constancy of
‘factor shares’ was later formalized by Nicholas Kaldor (1957) who put forward a list
of six stylized facts about economic growth, one of which was the historical tendency
for capital and labor income shares to remain approximately constant over time (about
1/3 and 2/3 respectively). By assuming that returns to labor and capital are constant
over time, neoclassical growth theory assumes that changes in distribution do not affect
growth.
In order for the neoclassical aggregate production function to be valid, two more
assumptions are required: (1) all firms (and the economy as a whole) must experience
constant returns to scale; and (2) the economy must be perfectly competitive. Constant
returns to scale is a property of a production function Y (K, L) such that increases
in the scale of capital and labor inputs yield a corresponding increase in total output.
Stated mathematically, this becomes:
1In many ways the “technical progress” term is a fudge-factor that adjusts for the empirical inaccuracy of
the Solow-Swan model. Without this term, the Solow-Swan model fails to explain a large portion of historical
growth (Ayres and Warr 2009).
2For a small sample of the literature critiquing production functions, see Felipe and Fisher 2003; Felipe
and Holz 2001; Fisher 1969; Robinson 1953; Shaikh 1974; Shaikh 2005
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Y (cK, cL) = cY (K, L) (2)
While, in principle, the production function of individual firms can have either constant,
increasing, or decreasing returns to scale, in order to maintain compatibility with the
marginal productivity theory of distribution, one must assume constant returns to scale.
This assumption arose from an ‘adding up’ problem that neoclassical economists first
faced when formulating the marginal productivity theory of distribution. Joan Robin-
son summarizes this issue: “How do we know that, if each factor is paid its marginal
product, the total product is disposed of without residue, positive or negative?” (1934,
p. 398).
Using a theorem developed by the mathematician Leonhard Euler, theologian Philip
Wicksteed (1894) formulated an elegant solution to the ‘adding up’ problem. He showed
that if one assumes that production exhibits constant returns to scale, then Euler’s the-
orem could be used to ‘prove’ that each factor receives payment in exact accordance
with its marginal productivity, thus solving the ‘adding up’ problem.3As a result of this
theorem, neoclassical growth theory (which maintains compatibility with neoclassical
distribution theory) is forced to assume that all firms have constant returns to scale. This
means that size is assumed to be neither an advantage nor disadvantage: all firms, large
or small, are given the same production function.
We now turn our attention to the assumption of perfect competition. Neoclassi-
cal theory predicts that under conditions of perfect competition, markets will allocate
resources in the most efficient manner possible (given existing patterns of distribu-
tion).4 Here, perfect competition is used specifically to mean that firms are price-takers:
they have no market power that allows them to dictate the price of their output. However,
as Coase (1937) noted, this results in a paradox. While the firm is the basic unit of pro-
duction in neoclassical theory, the theorized efficiency of perfect competition implies
that firms should not exist. According to neoclassical logic, the most efficient form of
production should occur when competition is most atomistic – when every individual
is self-employed.
Given this paradox, why does neoclassical theory continue to assume perfect com-
petition? Steve Keen (2001) argues that it is because without it, the most basic tenet of
neoclassical theory – the equilibrium-seeking price mechanism – cannot be justified.
Before explaining the problem, let us first review the neoclassical explanation of the
market. Arthur Salter says it best:
... the normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under
no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human
activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to con-
sumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic, and responsive. (1921, p. 15)
In neoclassical theory, the equilibrium-seeking quality of the free market is ex-
plained by the forces of supply and demand. Market equilibrium occurs at the inter-
3As used by Wicksteed, Euler’s Theorem states that if Y = f(a, b, c, ...) is a production function with
factors of production a, b, c, ... that exhibits constant returns to scale, then Y = a ∂Y
∂a
+ b ∂Y
∂b
+ c ∂Y
∂c
+ ....
That is, ouput Y is guaranteed to be the sum of the quantity of each factor times its marginal productivity.
4This is known as the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics: under conditions of perfect com-
petition, market equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. It is impossible to make any one individual better off without
making at least one individual worse off.
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section of supply and demand curves. These theoretical curves, in turn, are explained
in terms of the behavior of individual consumers and producers. The downward sloping
demand curve is explained by the law of diminishing marginal utility: a consumer will
derive a decreasing amount of pleasure from each additional unit of consumption. The
upward sloping supply curve is explained by the law of increasing marginal costs: each
additional unit of production is assumed to become costlier to produce.5 As long as all
firms are price-takers (meaning there is perfect competition), the resulting equilibrium
quantity of production is such that the market price equals both the marginal utility of
the buyer and the marginal cost of the supplier.
This elegant explanation of the price mechanism underlies all other aspects of neo-
classical theory. Yet without perfect competition, it fails to function. If firms have even
the slightest market power, then the equilibrium price will diverge from marginal costs,
causing the theory to break down. Steve Keen summarizes: “Unless perfect competi-
tion rules, there is no supply curve” (2001, p. 101). Thus, the assumption of perfect
competition is central to the internal consistency of neoclassical theory. When applied
to neoclassical growth theory, this leads to the conclusion that the optimal growth path
should be through atomistic competition: large firms should play no preferential role
(indeed, they should not exist). This amounts to an implicit assumption that concen-
trated power plays no role in growth.
To summarize, neoclassical growth theory assumes that distribution and institu-
tional size play no role in economic growth. In the following sections, I demonstrate
that these assumptions are directly contradicted by empirical evidence. First, however,
I review a major problem (that goes largely unnoticed) facing all economic growth the-
orists: the accepted measure of economic scale – ‘real’ GDP – is irreconcilably flawed.
2 Measuring Economic Growth
There is nothing more important to a theory of economic growth than the ability to ob-
jectively measure the scale of the economy. Without such a measure, a scientific theory
of growth is impossible. Unfortunately, the accepted measure of economic growth –
‘real’ GDP – is plagued by fundamental epistemological difficulties that render it fun-
damentally subjective.
Any act of measurement begins with an act of reduction. The observer must find a
suitable unit for reducing the qualities of the universe to a single quantity. The choice
of unit crucially affects this mapping of quantity onto quality. Thus, the concept of
economic growth is only meaningful if we can first agree on what it is that is growing.
To state formally, measuring material production (Y ) can only be done if we reduce it
to a single quantity, Q:
Y = Q (3)
In principle, Q can be defined in terms of any unit. However, before selecting a
particular unit, we must present arguments about why this unit is meaningful. Further-
5One might protest that the reverse may actually be true – that each additional unit of production will
cost less. While this may be true in reality, as Harold Lydall notes, “neoclassical theory is built on the ...
assumption of absence of economies of scale” (1971 p. 91).
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more, for a unit to be effective, it must be socially agreed upon, and it must not change
over time and space. Strangely, economists have chosen a unit – price – that does not
uphold this simple principle.
2.1 The Changing Meter Stick
Let us begin by looking not at the real world of heterogeneous production, but at an
imagined world in which production is homogenous. In this world, only apples are
produced, and they are all uniform. In this world, it makes sense to use “apples” as our
unit of measurement. If, in the year in question, 300 apples were produced, then:
Y = 300 apples (4)
Now imagine that our economy begins to produce both 300 apples and 100 oranges
(again, all uniform). Now production becomes:
Y = 300 apples+ 100 oranges (5)
This presents a problem: we wish to express Y in terms of a single quantity – but to
paraphrase an old adage, you can’t add apples and oranges. We must find a third unit
that allows the comparison of “apples” and “oranges”. Again, the unit must make sense.
For instance, if we were shipping apples and oranges in a truck, a common unit of mass
(kg) would make sense. Alternatively, if we simply wanted to eat them, a unit of energy
(calories) would be more appropriate.
Since the study of prices is their domain, economists naturally choose monetary
value as a common unit of aggregation. This seems reasonable: the price of an orange is
much more important to the average person than almost any other metric (mass, energy,
etc.).
Keeping with this tradition, we now measure output Y in units of dollars. In order to
do so, we must know both the quantity of apples and oranges (QA andQO, respectively)
and their unit prices (PA and PO). Production now becomes:
Y = QAPA +QOPO (6)
Using the quantities from above (300 apples and 100 oranges) and adding prices of
$3 and $1 for apples and oranges respectively, we get the quantity of production:
Y = (300 apples)(3 $/apple) + (100 oranges)(1 $/orange)
= $900 + $100
= $1000
(7)
Despite the definiteness of our answer, the matter is soon complicated when we re-
alize that our chosen unit (the price of a commodity) changes all the time! For instance,
the following year, we might produce the same quantity of apples and oranges, but the
price of apples falls drastically to the same price as oranges ( $1). Then, without any
physical changes, our measure of output is drastically reduced:
Y = (300 apples)(1 $/apple) + (100 oranges)(1 $/orange)
= $300 + $100
= $400
(8)
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Which one of these measures of material production is “correct”? Here lies the
fundamental problem: both of them are! By choosing price as an appropriate unit for
measurement, we immediately remove the possibility of attaining a single measure for
the quantity of output because our unit is not socially agreed upon over time. No amount
of intellectual gymnastics can get us out of this dilemma. Without an objective way to
decide the year in which prices were ‘correct’6, our measure of economic scale is simply
not well defined.
For those who remain unconvinced by this conceptual argument using imagined
numbers, we can apply the same reasoning to an empirical example (Fig. 1). Here we
use historical quantity and price data for the production of cars and computers (mostly
from the United States). Unlike above, now both prices and the physical configuration of
production change. Again, we must choose a ‘base’ year in which prices were ‘correct’,
and then fix this price across time. This creates a ‘real’ GDP time-series for our 2
product economy. Different choices of base year drastically change the way we conceive
of output growth.7 Indeed, the economy simultaneously grows considerably and hardly
at all!
A further difficulty with real GDP methodology is that commodities change qualita-
tively over time. Neither the computers nor the cars of 1980 looked anything like those
of 2010. In order to combat this problem, statistical agencies attempt to measure these
qualitative changes. However, we again encounter a number of fundamental problems.
Firstly, we must subdivide a given commodity into relevant attributes. But how do we
objectively decide those attributes that are relevant and those that are irrelevant?
Furthermore, once we have reduced a commodity to its constituent attributes, how
do we decide their relative importance? The most popular method is called hedonic
quality adjustment. The Bureau of Labor Statistics summarizes the process as follows:
In price index methodology, hedonic quality adjustment has come to mean
the practice of decomposing an item into its constituent characteristics, ob-
taining estimates of the value of the utility derived from each characteristic,
and using those value estimates to adjust prices when the quality of a good
changes. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010)(emphasis added)
All quantitative comparisons require a unit of measurement. Here we see that the
Bureau of Labor Statistics is attempting to measure the attributes of a commodity in
units of utility. This is problematic because utility (a hypothetical psychic flux) cannot
be directly measured; rather, it must always be ‘revealed’ through prices (Samuelson
1938). Thus, hedonic measurement becomes circular: distinguishing changes in price
from changes in quality requires knowledge of consumer preferences; however, con-
6There is no such objective way to decide the ‘correctness’ of prices (Cochrane 2011). Appeals to the
contrary always imply an additional unit used to explain prices. For Marxists, this is a commodity’s socially-
necessary, abstract labor content. For neoclassicists, it reduces to the marginal utility derived from a com-
modity. In both cases, the argument for a “correct” price rests upon its correlation with a hidden quantity
which (conveniently) cannot ever be measured. A more logically sound way to think about prices is that they
are always ‘correct’, by definition.
7The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is aware of this problem. Its response has been to concede
that the choice of base year is subjective. However, rather than conclude that this invalidates real GDP (as I
have), the BEA has adopted a new method, called ‘chain-weighting’, that uses a moving average for all base
years (Steindel 1995). While this might seem reasonable, it is similar to measuring your height in both meters
and feet and then averaging the data to arrive at your ‘true’ height. The result is meaningless.
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Figure 1: Measuring Production with a Changing Meter Stick
Note: This methodology is modeled after critiques of capital aggregation offered by Nitzan & Bichler
(2009). Sources: Quantity of cars from Ward’s Automotive Group, “U.S. Car and Truck Sales, 1931-2012”
at wardsauto.com/public-data. Quantity of computers from Jeremy Reimer, Total Share: Personal Computer
Market Share 1975-2010, jeremyreimer.com. Price of cars from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 10.11,
Average Price of a New Car, 1970-2011 (using domestic prices). Computer prices are from the Wikipedia
entry for personal computer. Note: computer price indices from US Bureau of Labor statistics are unsuitable
here because they adjust for changing computer quality (ie: processor speed, memory, etc.).
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sumer preferences can be measured only through prices.8
To summarize, when measuring the quantity of production in terms of prices, we
fall victim to a changing meter stick. When measuring changes in the quality of a
commodity, our unit cannot actually be measured independently of prices. The logical
choice at this point is to abandon prices as a unit for quantifying material output. A
more appropriate approach – one that meshes nicely with the current state of scientific
knowledge – is to use energy as our unit.
2.2 Energy and the Thermodynamic Basis of Growth
Using energy as a metric for growth is logical for two reasons: firstly, the units are well
defined; and secondly (and most importantly) it is physically meaningful. Astrophysi-
cist Eric Chaisson (2002) writes that “[e]nergy – the ability to do work, or to cause
change – is the most universal currency known in natural science”. What seemed like
separate phenomena 200 years ago – heat, motion, light, electricity, magnetism, chem-
ical potential – are now recognized to be different forms of a universal property we call
energy. The science of energetics has made great advances in understanding and quan-
tifying energy in its many forms. Because of its universality, energy is especially useful
for the study of seemingly disparate processes.
There is virtually unanimous agreement that energy flows form the basis for all bio-
logical life (Kondepudi and Prigogine 1998; Lotka 1956; Morowitz and E. Smith 2007;
Odum 1988; Schrodinger 1992). Life is a subset of what are referred to by physicists
as ‘non-equilibrium structures’. Equilibrium, in thermodynamics, is the state towards
which all isolated systems evolve. This state of maximum entropy can be thought of
as the most boring situation imaginable – homogeneous temperature and pressure, no
changes over time, and no organized structure.
Without flows of energy, all roads lead to equilibrium. However, the flow of energy
through a system leads to the permanent departure from equilibrium and can cause the
emergence of complex ‘dissipative structures’ (Kondepudi and Prigogine 1998). Along
with single organisms, the notion of a dissipative structure can be extended to include
ecosystems and human societies. Indeed, the importance of energy to human societies
is well-recognized (Cottrell 2009; Debeir 1991; Hall and Klitgaard 2012; Georgescu-
Roegen 1971; Smil 1994). The laws of thermodynamics indicate that for human society
to grow its structure, it must consume more energy. It only makes sense, then, to use
energy as a metric for growth.
Measuring energy consumption, however, is not without difficulties: we must decide
‘where’ to measure energy flow. I use the word ‘where’ not in the spacial sense, but
in the conceptual sense. The use of energy involves numerous transformations into
numerous forms. Pre-analytic decisions about accounting methodology will drastically
change our final results.
This can be illustrated by following the energy required to power a car (Fig. 2). In
our example, fossil fuel energy initially enters the economy in the form of crude oil.
The crude oil is then transformed into gasoline, which involves some energy losses.
The gasoline is burned in an internal combustion engine (turning chemical energy into
8For an in-depth critique of hedonic quality adjustment and revealed preference theory, see Nitzan (1992
and Wong (1978), respectively.
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Figure 2: ‘Where’ to Measure Energy Consumption?
thermal energy) before ultimately being transformed into the kinetic energy of an auto-
mobile. At each stage of this process, energy is lost. Thus, depending on ‘where’ we
measure its flow, we’ll get very different data for the consumption of energy.
The most straightforward ‘place’ to measure energy consumption is as it enters the
economy as a primary energy resource (most statistical agencies use this method). Since
there are relatively few varieties of primary energy, this type of accounting is relatively
easy.9 As we move towards end-use energy, accounting becomes increasingly complex,
as the number of potential categories grows astronomically.
While some scholars argue that quantifying end-use energy is impossible (Giampi-
etro, Mayumi, and Sorman 2013), Robert Ayres and Benjamin Warr (2005) have made
a laudable first attempt, calling their result ‘useful work’. While I will not discuss the
details of their methodology here, the process involves a conceptual simplification of
the types of end-use categories and a calculation of the aggregate efficiency of each
category (in a given year).10
The purpose of Ayres & Warr’s useful work calculation is to enter it into a produc-
tion function capable of hind-casting the growth of “real” GDP (Ayres and Warr 2009).
Indeed, numerous scholars have made the link between growth in energy consumption
and the growth in GDP (Cleveland, Costanza, et al. 1984; Cleveland, Kaufmann, and
Stern 2000; Garrett 2012; Hirsch 2008; Stern 2011). All studies show a high corre-
lation between the two. Few scholars, however, have made the conceptual leap that I
make here: that energy is a valid growth metric unto itself.
I assert that useful work stands on its own as one of the best metrics of biophysical
scale. For the rest of the paper I use energy consumption as my metric for the biophysical
scale of the economy. When data is available, I use Ayres & Warr’s useful work metric.
When such data is unavailable, I simple use primary energy consumption.
9Depending on how they are categorized, the basic primary energy forms are: fossil fuel, nuclear, hydro-
electric, wind, solar, and biomass.
10Ayres & Warr create 5 categories of useful work: Electricity, Heat (low, mid, high), Mechanical Drive,
Light, Muscle Work.
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3 Distribution and Growth
My goal is to connect changes in useful work to changes in economic distribution. How-
ever, any discussion of distribution must begin by defining the types of income. Modern
systems of national accounts allocate income into five main categories: wages, propri-
etor, rent, interest, and profit. Each type of income is accompanied by a particular
institutional arrangement, explained below.
Wages
Wages accrue to workers who ‘own’ their labor but who do not own what they produce
(Marx 1867). Since ownership is defined as an act of enclosure, this implies that a
wage earner must have the ability to restrict access to his/her labor. Workers who do
not earn income have either lost this ability (i.e. slaves) or have decided not to enforce
it (i.e. domestic labor). The enclosure of human labor can be magnified through group
coordination in the form of unions and combinations. By refusing to work, these groups
of workers reinforce the enclosure of their labor, thereby strengthening their bargaining
position.11
Proprietor
Sole-proprietors12 own their labor and the things they produce. The classic example of
the sole-proprietor was in the so-called ‘putting-out’ system of early capitalism (Polanyi
1964). Rural inhabitants produced goods that they then sold. Thus, the clearest dis-
tinction between sole-proprietorship and wage labor can be made by contrasting the
putting-out system with factory system: in the latter, workers clearly do not own what
they produced, while in the former they do.
Rent
Rent implies ownership of a specific ‘thing’. Thus, rent accrues to owners of land, in-
frastructure, and natural resources. However, it can also be earned by owning less tangi-
ble things like intellectual property. In the US national accounting system, rent can only
flow to a person, not an institution. Thus, when corporations or sole-proprietorships
earn income by renting out property, it is automatically called profit or proprietor in-
come (respectively).13
Profit
Profit flows to the owners of business equity. This is a more abstract form of income than
rent, as it implies ownership of a legal structure rather than a specific piece of property.
11For empirical evidence linking union membership to labor’s share of national income, see Brennan
(2012).
12Technically, Proprietor income also includes partnerships. Proprietorship is effectively a category for all
businesses activity that is not incorporated.
13The rent category is further complicated by the accepted practice of treating home ownership as a business
activity. Thus, the Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates an imputed rent for all owner-occupied buildings.
To whom this rent is actually paid remains unclear.
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In return for owning this equity, owners gain a say in business decision-making.
Interest
Interest flows to those who own debt. By lending money, a creditor essentially purchases
the rights to a future income stream – interest. In this sense, interest is associated with
the most abstract form of ownership – ownership of nothing but an income stream it-
self. Modern business practices have made the distinction between profit and interest
(equity and debt) difficult to discern. However, there are important differences. Firstly,
debt offers a fairly stable rate of return (dictated by interest rates), while profit is often
volatile. Secondly, owners of debt (unlike owners of equity) have no decision-making
authority unless the company enters receivership.
3.1 The Differential Growth of Income
Now that we have defined the various types of income and attributed them to specific
types of ownership, we can move on to the task of connecting them with growth. I ask
the following question: under a growth regime, who are the relative winners and who
are the relative losers? In order to investigate this question, I follow Nitzan & Bichler
(2009) in discarding the use of ‘real’ metrics of income in favor of differential ones. I
conceptualize different types of income as slices of a giant pecuniary pie (Fig. 3), and
then investigate relative changes in the size of each slice. The goal is to compare these
changes to the rate of economic growth.
I begin by explicitly stating my methodology. Equation 9 shows a sample calculation
for wages. On the left side, we divide useful work (U ) by population (P ) to get useful
work per capita. We then calculate the annual growth rate – signified by the hat symbol
Wages
Profit
Proprietor
Interest
Rent
Other
United States
2012
Figure 3: The Pecuniary Pie
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.12,
National Income by Type of Income
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(̂ ). We then compare this to the rate of change of the wage bill (W ) as a portion of
national income (NI) (right side).[̂
U
P
]
⇐⇒
̂[ W
NI
]
(9)
The results for this methodology, carried out over the 5 classes of income, are dis-
played in Table 1 in descending order of correlation. Positive correlation indicates that
higher growth rates of useful work are associated with a differential increase in the
income-type in question. Conversely, negative correlation (−) indicates that higher use-
ful work growth rates are associated with a differential decrease in that income-type.
The results are striking: the growth of useful work overwhelmingly occurs under
conditions in which income is redistributed towards profit (Fig. 4). Stated in the lan-
guage of systems theory, growth and profit redistribution exhibit a positive feedback re-
lation, while all other income types exhibit negative feedback with growth. This finding
is significant because only positive feedback relations are capable of generating expo-
nential growth (Meadows 2008). Negative feedback is inherently stabilizing, causing
systems to evolve towards a steady-state.
But what is so special about profit? Why is it the only income-type that is positively
correlated with growth? To answer this question, we must investigate the institutional
context under which profit-making occurs.
Table 1: Correlation Between Income Redistribution & Growth
Income Type R2
Profit 0.52
Interest (−) 0.28
Rent (−) 0.16
Wages (−) 0.15
Proprietor 0.08
Note: Data is for correlation between annual growth rate of useful work per
capita and annual change in each factor’s share of national income. Profit cor-
relation excludes the years 1932-33; when included R2 drops to 0.23. All
income data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.12.. Data series:
Corporate profits with IVA and CCAdj, Net interest and miscellaneous pay-
ments, Rental income of persons with CCAdj, Compensation of employees,
Proprietors’ income with IVA and CCAdj. Data for useful work and US pop-
ulation is from Benjamin Warr’s REXS database.
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national income data are from BEA Table 1.12., National Income by Type of Income.
4 The Institutional Context
I begin with a simple truism: if a change in economic distribution is to have any effect
on a society, it is because this change moves money (and power) into different hands.
Of course, this seems trivial – what is a change in distribution if not a change in who
controls what? However, I argue that it is only when profit is coupled with hierarchy
that a relative change in profit moves money and power into different hands. In all
other institutional arrangements, introducing/increasing profit has no discernible effect
on who controls what – it merely shifts the way that money is accounted on paper.
Before I proceed, let me first discuss how to interpret Figures 5–7. Each figure
contains a visualization of a specific form of institution. On the left-hand side, the
black arrows show an income stream that flows to the institution. This income is then
split into different accounting categories that vary according to the type of business.
All businesses incur non-labor costs, which flow to other individuals or institutions
(where they count as income). The rest of the income stream is divided between profit,
salary/wages, or proprietor’s income. Wages and proprietor’s income flow directly to
individuals, while profit flows to the owners of institutions (dotted lines). The dotted
red line represents decision-making power over how the original income stream is split.
In each example, the arrows are labelled by accompanying percentages, signifying the
hypthetical size of the flow in relation to the original income stream.
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Figure 5: Atomistic Institutions
4.1 Atomistic Institutions
Atomistic institutions consist of a single, self-employed person (Fig. 5). There are
two possible configurations: the sole-proprietorship or the self-employed individual
who incorporates his/her business. Modern accounting principles dictate that a sole-
proprietor’s income be called ‘proprietor income’, and not profit. However, the distinc-
tion is in name only – both profit and proprietor income are defined as the total sales
less the costs of doing business. If a self-employed individual incorporates, this allows
for a conceptual (and legal) separation of income into ‘profit’ and ‘salary’.
There are two main benefits to incorporating. Firstly, corporations are limited lia-
bility institutions, which allows a legal separation of business and personal assets. In
the event of a bankruptcy, only business assets can be seized. The second benefit is
that profit is generally taxed at a different rate than a salary. For instance, in 2011, the
effective US corporate tax rate was 21%, while the highest tax rate for personal income
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was 35%.14 Despite these differences, the two forms of business displayed in Figure 5
are, for all intents and purposes, the same.
Let us envision a society populated only by these two institutional configurations
(similar to the one imagined by Adam Smith (1776). We ask the following question:
what is the effect of redistributing income from wages and proprietor income towards
profit?
There are two possible ways for this to occur. The first is if a sole-proprietor decides
to incorporate his/her business. This would eliminate his/her proprietor income from
the national accounts, but add wage and profit income in the same amount. The effect
would be a change on paper, but no meaningful change in who actually controls this
income (the same person in both cases). Alternately, a self-employed person with an
incorporated business might decide to allocate more income to profit rather than to
salary (if tax rates changed, for instance). Again this has no meaningful effect outside
of a re-categorization on paper: in both cases the individual’s total income remains
unchanged.
For a society populated entirely by atomistic institutions, it is difficult to see how an
income redistribution towards profit would change anything but the abstract accounting
category used to classify income.
4.2 Flat Institutions
We now move on to institutions that include more than one person. We begin with non-
hierarchical, or so-called ‘flat’, institutions (Fig. 6). A flat institution is characterized
by a complete lack of hierarchy. In its ideal form, this means that each individual has an
equal say in all decision-making processes. Our hypothetical, flat institution can either
be operated as a non-profit organization (i.e. a cooperative), or as a flat corporation
(with ownership divided equally among its members). In the former case, all income
in excess of costs is allocated to salaries, while in the latter case, this income is split
between profit and salaries.
As we did previously, we imagine a society populated only by such flat institutions.
Again, we ask: what is the effect of a redistribution of income towards profit? This
could occur two ways – either by non-profits deciding to become for-profit, or by for-
profits increasing their markup (profit as a portion of total income). In neither case
does this change affect the ultimate control of the pre-existing income stream (which is
always allocated equally to all individuals). However, the re-categorization of salaries
into profit does have the effect of pooling income. For instance, having a group of 5
people control $100 000 in profit is different than having each of those 5 people control
$20 000 in salaries. Pooling income allows for the possibility of a larger ‘investment’
than would be possible otherwise.
However, the ability to pool income does not require profit. Indeed, the initial in-
come stream is the ultimate source of any pooled income. Thus, if a co-operative wishes
to make a large purchase, it may simply divert more of its income stream towards ‘costs’
and less towards salaries. The end result is the same.
14Corporate tax rate is calculated by dividing total before tax profit by total tax collected, using BEA Table
1.12. Income tax rate is from IRS Table 23, U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemptions.
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Figure 6: Flat Institutions
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Figure 7: Hierarchical Institutions
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As we did with single-person institutions, we reach the conclusion that when profit
only flows to flat institutions, an income redistribution towards profit should have no
effect outside of a change on paper.
4.3 Hierarchical Institutions
We now move on to hierarchical institutions (Fig. 7). Here we envision the quintessen-
tial hierarchy that is marked by a strict top to bottom chain of command, with all
decision-making power ultimately residing at the top. We have two possible types of in-
stitution – the hierarchical non-profit and the hierarchical corporation. A good example
of hierarchical non-profits are state-owned companies like Fannie Mae or PetroChina,
while Walmart and General Motors are examples of hierarchical corporations.
As before, we are interested in the effect of redistributing income towards profit, but
now in a society populated entirely by hierarchical institutions. There are two possible
scenarios: either a non-profit organization may become a for-profit (as when a state-
owned company is privatized) or a for-profit organization could increase its markup.
Unlike our previous examples, here both scenarios imply a significant change in who
controls what. A differential increase in profit will serve to concentrate income at the
top of the chain of command.
The results of our conceptual investigation demonstrate that it is only when coupled
with hierarchy that a redistribution towards profit has any meaningful effect on who
controls what. In all other institutional settings, introducing/increasing profit has no
effect beyond a shift in abstract accounting categories.
5 Connecting Hierarchy, Distribution, and Growth
Given the empirical link between redistribution and the growth of energy consumption,
and our finding that relative changes in profit are only meaningful if they occur within
a hierarchical institution, it seems logical to look for connections between hierarchy,
profit, and growth. To do so, we must decide on a metric for hierarchy. Inspired by
Nitzan and Bichler’s (2009) concept of ‘breadth’, I propose using the employment share
of the largest n corporations as such a measure (where n is an arbitrary number cho-
sen based on data availability). The logic underpinning this metric is straightforward:
large corporations are hierarchical institutions; therefore, the extent to which such cor-
porations dominate total employment should give us an indication of the ‘degree of
hierarchy’ of society.
5.1 Hierarchy and Growth
In order to connect hierarchy and growth, I continue to use energy per capita as my met-
ric for growth. However, due to the lack of data at the global level, I use primary energy
consumption, rather than useful work. My methodology is straightforward: I simply
compare corporate employment concentration to energy use per capita and look for
correlation. The results of this analysis, undertaken first at the international level (Fig.
8) and then at the national level (Fig. 9), demonstrate a clear connection (across both
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Figure 8: Global Corporate Employment Concentration vs. Energy Use
Sources: National energy use per capita and total labor force data is from the World Bank (in-
dicator codes EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE. and SL.TLF.TOTL.IN, respectively). Employment of top
10 corporations (ranked by number of employees) is from COMPUSTAT Global Fundamentals
(series EMP).
space and time) between corporate employment concentration and energy consumption
per capita.
From a neoclassical perspective, this finding is puzzling. Indeed, neoclassical growth
theory assumes that concentrated power should play no role in the growth process. The
evidence, however, suggests just the opposite: growth is consistently associated with a
decline in competition and an increase in the control of large corporations. That is to
say, growth and the concentration of power appear to be intrinsically related.
5.2 Hierarchy and Profit
So far, I have empirically connected relative changes in profit to changes in energy con-
sumption, and I have empirically connected changes in hierarchy to changes in energy
consumption. The last piece of the puzzle needed to create a three-way connection be-
tween hierarchy, profit and growth, is to link relative changes in profit to changes in
hierarchy. In order to do this, I turn to capitalist income, which consists of the sum of
profit and interest. An important question to ask is – does the composition of capitalist
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Figure 9: US Corporate Employment Concentration and Energy Use per Capita
Sources: Total US employment from BEA Tables 6.5 B-D (Full-Time Equivalent Employees by
Industry). Employment of top 200 corporations (ranked by number of employees) from COM-
PUSTAT (series DATA29). Total energy consumption from EIA Table 1.3 (Primary Energy
Consumption by Source). Total labor hours from BEA Tables 6.9 B-D (Hours Worked by Full-
Time and Part-Time Employees by Industry).
income (the balance between interest and profit) affect hierarchy formation?
Political economists have long sought to understand the differences between inter-
est and profit. In Marxist political economy, interest is generally regarded as para-
sitic,15and profit (while exploitative) is regarded as productive. However, Nitzan and
Bichler (2009) challenge this long-held belief. They note that, for the absentee owner,
there is very little practical difference between owning debt (and earning interest) ver-
sus owning equity (and earning profit). In either case the goal is the same: to transform
capital into an income stream. Nitzan and Bichler argue that interest represents the
‘normal’ rate of return, while profit offers the chance to beat this normal rate.
While both debt and equity holders should both be considered ‘owners’ of a cor-
poration, there is an important legal difference between the two forms of ownership.
Other than when a corporation is in receivership, debt holders have no legal control
over business decisions – it is equity holders that have this right. If a particular equity
holder owns enough stock (and often owning only a small fraction of outstanding stock
is enough) he or she has complete control of business decision-making. If we think of
15Marx referred to interest-bearing capital as ‘usurer’s capital’ (1894, Ch. 36).
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Figure 10: Connecting Profit to Corporate Concentration
Sources: Total US employment from BEA Tables 6.5 B-D (Full-Time Equivalent Employees by
Industry). Employment of top 200 corporations (ranked by number of employees) from COM-
PUSTAT (series DATA29). Profit and Interest from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.12,
data series: Corporate profits with IVA and CCAdj, Net interest and miscellaneous payments.
this in terms of hierarchy, then it is clear that equity holders (with controlling shares)
are at the top of the corporate pyramid. Debt holders, on the other hand, are only at the
top if a corporation files for bankruptcy (i.e. during periods of crisis).
How, then, does the composition of capitalist income relate to hierarchy formation?
Figure 10 gives insight into this question. Here we plot the annual rate of change of US
corporate employment concentration (smoothed with a 10 year moving average) against
the share of profit in capitalist income (also smoothed with a 10 year moving average).
The correlation is clear: corporate concentration (i.e. hierarchy) grows more rapidly
when capitalist income is dominated by profit, and more slowly when capitalist income
is dominated by interest (R2 is 0.70 for smoothed data, 0.17 for raw data). Profit, it
would seem, is key for hierarchy formation.
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6 Putting Power Back into Growth Theory
Having established a three-way link between profit, hierarchy and growth, I now offer
my own hypotheses about why this connection exists. While speculative at this point,
these hypotheses offer plausible grounds for future inquiry.
6.1 Hierarchy and Group Size
The evidence suggests that the growth of energy consumption requires the formation
of large, hierarchical organizations that are capable of mobilizing vast groups of people
towards a single objective. But why is this the case? Why can’t growth be accomplished
by the random interactions of atomistic institutions (as neoclassical theory suggests)?
One possible explanation (which I pursue here) is that humans have evolved to func-
tion in small, egalitarian groups. Without coercive, centralized power, such small-scale
groups will not be able (or willing) to coordinate their actions. In order to coordinate
larger groups of people, egalitarian relationships must be abandoned in favor of hier-
archical ones. Recent anthropological research supports the hypothesis that egalitarian
group size is fundamentally constrained by human brain size.
The ability to form social groups is, in large part, a function of genetic inheritance.
This becomes obvious when we compare different species: many animals (such as
bears) are incapable of forming large groups, while others (such as wolves) do so nat-
urally. All social organisms have evolved mechanisms that maintain the cohesiveness
of their groups. In primates, it appears that this has involved the development of large
brains.
In a remarkable study, anthropologist Robin Dunbar (1992) found that the group
size of different primates was highly correlated with the relative size of their neocortex
(Fig. 11). His conclusion was that neocortex size places an upper limit on the num-
ber of social relations that can be monitored by an individual. That is, since managing
social relationships requires computational ability, brain size imposes a limit on group
size. From his results on non-human primates, Dunbar (1993) extrapolates to find that
human brain size predicts a group-size limit of about 150 (often called ‘Dunbar’s num-
ber’). While this number should be considered exploratory, Dunbar notes that Neolithic
villages had populations in this order of magnitude. Clearly, however, humans have de-
veloped ways of vastly exceeding this social scale: modern cities can surpass Dunbar’s
number by five orders of magnitude.
If we accept Dunbar’s hypothesis, it follows that any mechanism that allows vast
increases in group size must function to limit internal interactions between group mem-
bers. Neoclassical theory attempts to prove that ‘the market’ is the ultimate organiza-
tional mechanism. Unfortunately, ‘the market’ does not act to limit the number of social
interactions; instead, it replaces qualitative relationships with quantitative ones (by in-
troducing prices). Therefore, ‘the market’ may act to simplify or ‘standardize’ social
relationships, but it does not act to limit their number: any member of a group can still
engage in a market exchange with any other member of the group.
Unlike the market, Turchin and Gavrilets (2009) note that hierarchical organization
allows group size to grow without a corresponding increase in the number of interper-
sonal relationships. A member of a hierarchy needs to have a relationship only with
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Figure 11: Mean group size vs. relative neocortex size for various primate species
Note: Plot icons (squares, cirlcles, etc.) represent different primate genera. Rest of the brain =
total brain volume less neocortex). Source: Dunbar (1992).
Figure 12: Hierarchical complexity vs. population of six historical empires
Note: Hierarchical complexity is counted in terms of the number of distinct administrative levels.
Source: Turchin and Gavrilets (2009).
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Figure 13: Hierarchical complexity vs. firm size
Source: Child (1973). ‘Aston’, ‘National’ and ‘Blau & Schoenherr’
refer to different firm datasets.
his direct superior and his direct subordinates. If the number of subordinates is s (the
span of control), then the number of direct interpersonal relationships required by any
member is at most s+ 1.
Looking at historical agrarian empires, Turchin and Gavrilets find a strong logarith-
mic scaling relation between group size and the number of administrative levels within
the society (Fig. 12). Thus, evidence suggests that hierarchy tends to scale with group
size.
Logarithmic scaling (between group size and the number of administrative levels)
is a predictable result of group size expansion under a fixed span of control. For any
hierarchical group with a fixed span of control, the total number of members (n) can be
expressed as a geometric series of the span of control (s). If L represents the number
of hierarchical levels (and assuming the top level contains one person), then the total
number of group members is equal to:
n = 1 + s+ s2 + s3 + ...+ sL−1 (10)
Using the formula for the sum of a geometric series, this can rewritten as:
n =
1− sL
1− s (11)
As a rough estimate, we can simplify equation 11 to equation 12, which indicates that
the number of group members varies exponentially with the number of hierarchical
levels. Equation 12, in turn, can be rearranged to equation 13, which indicates that the
number of hierarchical levels varies approximately logarithmically with the number of
group members.
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n ∝∼ sL−1 (12)
L ∝∼ log n (13)
This logarithmic scaling appears to be robust across space and time. In the modern
era, John Child (1973) finds a logarithmic scaling between modern corporation employ-
ment size and the number of hierarchical levels (Fig. 13). Hierarchy, it seems, plays an
essential (and predictable) role in organizing large groups of humans. Indeed, one is
hard-pressed to find an example of a large organization that exists without any hierarchy.
Given the link between increases in corporate employment concentration and the
growth of energy consumption, a reasonable hypothesis is that growth requires the co-
ordination of ever-increasing swathes of humanity, and that hierarchy is the path of least
resistance for such coordination.
6.2 Profit as the Fountain Head of Authority
All hierarchical institutions must have systems for legitimizing the authority of supe-
riors and rationalizing the subservience of subordinates. Weber (1958) divided legit-
imization strategies into three categories: charismatic authority, traditional authority,
and legal authority. Of these three, charismatic authority is by far the least stable, since
there is no mechanism for transferring authority after the death of the leader.
Traditional authority is usually associated with feudal systems, or any hierarchical
system based on birthright. Such systems often have elaborate ideologies for rational-
izing inherited authority. Peter Turchin (2010) argues that it is not coincidental that the
major world religions and the first large empires emerged during the same era (the Axial
Age, 800–200 BC); religion is highly effective at legitimizing authority. By appealing
to God as the source of their power, the kings of antiquity gained access to a potent
ideological tool for legitimizing their authority. .
According to Weber, the modern era is different from all other eras in that the rule
of law has become the dominant mode of authority. Under such a system, authority has
little or nothing to do with the characteristics of the ruler or his family lineage, but is
instead based on a system of law that is (ideally) applied uniformly to all people. Still,
laws must stem from a core belief system.
Nitzan and Bichler argue that the kernel of the modern nomos is a pervasive belief
in the principle of capitalization: the belief that anything that can be ‘owned’ may be
reduced to a single, abstract quantity of money. Nitzan and Bichler note:
Faith in the principle of capitalization now has more followers than all of the
world’s religions combined. It is accepted everywhere – from New York and Lon-
don to Beijing and Teheran. In fact, the belief has spread so widely that it is now
used regularly to discount not only capitalist income, but also the income of wage
earners, governments, and, indeed, society at large. (2009, p. 8)
Capitalization allows a systematic way of defining reciprocity: if prices are equiva-
lent, an ownership exchange is culturally defined as being reciprocal (Hornborg 1992).
In a capitalist society, hierarchical relations are rationalized by appealing to the reci-
procity of monetary transactions. We all accept that the owner of a business enterprise
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is the rightful ‘ruler’ of his employees. Why is his authority legitimate? Because he
exchanged money for ownership.
As Nitzan and Bichler note, by investing his money, the capitalist gains culturally
sanctioned power to mobilize and control human labor. Importantly, this power appears
(to the participants) as a reciprocal exchange, because it is wielded through a mone-
tary transaction. This veil of reciprocity is illustrated by the terminology used: while
military leaders command, capitalists invest.
Thus, capital is a potent tool for legitimizing authority and facilitating the growth of
large hierarchies. The steps that lead to this authority are similar (in principle) to those
that lead to the divine authority of kings:
Divine Kingship
1. God is the ultimate authority.
2. Kings are ordained by God.
3. Kings are legitimate holders of power.
Capitalization
1. Monetary exchange is reciprocal.
2. Capitalists exchange money (capital) for ‘ownership’.
3. Owners are legitimate holders of power.
However, unlike other forms of authority, capital has a finite magnitude that is de-
pleted when power is wielded. This presents a problem: unless capital can be renewed,
it will be an ephemeral source of power. Thus, a return on the investment of capital is a
fundamental requirement of capitalist authority: it allows the potential for authority to
become self-renewing.
This return on investment can be realized either through interest or profit. However,
for the process of hierarchy formation, the evidence suggests that profit is key. Why
is this the case? It could be because profit is associated with equity, and ownership of
equity gives direct command of the corporate hierarchy. Interest, on the other hand,
is associated with corporate bonds, which do not give the bond-holder any say in cor-
porate decision-making. While this is a plausible explanation, I leave a more in-depth
investigation for future research.
Whatever the reason for the primacy of profit in hierarchy formation, based on the
evidence in this paper, I propose the following three-way linkage between profit, hier-
archy and growth:
1. The expansion of hierarchy is necessary for growth.
2. Hierarchy formation is legitimized by the investment of capital.
3. Capital accumulation, through profit, acts as a fountain head of
legitimacy, allowing further expansion of hierarchy.
4. The expansion of hierarchy drives growth.
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7 Conclusions
The evidence discussed in this paper is fundamentally at odds with the assumptions
made by neoclassical growth theory: both distribution and large institutions (concen-
trated power) play a central role in growth. Thus, any growth theory that wishes to
explain reality must begin by discarding neoclassical principles.
The theory that I have advanced draws heavily on Nitzan and Bichler’s Capital as
Power framework, which is unique in political economy in that it asserts that capital is
unproductive. Nitzan and Bichler conceive of capital as a form of power derived from
the legal right to strategically limit production. But this leads to a paradox: if capital is
unproductive, why has the capitalist era witnessed the most stupendous period of growth
in the history of humanity (1800 to the present). How do we resolve this paradox?
Nitzan and Bichler are correct to assert that capital accumulation has little to do
with productivity. Based on thermodynamic principles, we must insist that productiv-
ity stems from the transformation of energy. The role of physical capital (I prefer the
term technomass) is to facilitate energy transformation into forms usable by humans
(think of the tractor converting fossil fuels into mechanical work). However, we should
not conflate technomass with financial capital (or simply capital). The latter is a quan-
titative abstraction that cannot be productive, by virtue of its non-physical existence.
Nitzan and Bichler argue that modern corporations are megamachines – Lewis Mum-
ford’s (1970) term for large hierarchical organizations that function as machines by
using humans as components. I argue that capital is a potent tool for facilitating the
growth of such megamachines – much more potent than appeals to the divine. Because
belief in the reciprocity of monetary transactions is nearly universal, capital investment
legitimizes the authority of those at the top of the corporate megamachine. It is the ex-
pansion of the corporate megamachine that then drives growth.16 Capital accumulation
thus plays a role in growth by allowing capitalists to organize vast pools of human labor,
but it must be stressed that capital serves an ideological purpose, not a physical one: it
veils power under the guise of monetary reciprocity.
But – and this is key – hierarchy formation seems only to occur under capital ac-
cumulation through profit (not interest). I have hypothesized that this is because profit
flows to those actually in command of corporate hierarchies, while interest is passive
income. The balance between profit and interest seems to determine whether employ-
ment is added in large versus atomistic institutions, and this employment balance is then
related to the rate of growth.
Many questions arise from this provocative reformulation of growth theory. Perhaps
most importantly, will the empirical linkages between profit, hierarchy, and growth con-
tinue into the future? How will energy limits (due to the inherent finite nature of fossil
fuels) affect this linkage? Will the capitalist mode of power be viable in a ‘degrowth’
(negative growth) future? Such questions ought to be at the center of a power-based
theory of growth.
16It is highly likely that causation goes both ways (i.e. that the growth of energy consumption is also
necessary for the expansion of large, hierarchical organizations). I leave investigation of this circularity for a
future date.
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